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PARA-SITES: THE CASE FOR HYPERLINKING AS
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet enables society to share information and ideas more
effectively than ever before. The dissemination of information on the
Internet, unlike the use of books, magazines, or other traditional print
media, is not constrained by the costs and delay of printing. Once an
author makes his or her work available on the Internet, it is immediately
accessible by millions of people around the world. The ease with which
the Internet is accessed dramatically changes the way that copyrighted
works are reproduced and distributed. However, that accessibility can also
facilitate the infringement of those copyrights.' In attempting to maintain
the balance between the benefits offered by the Internet and the rights of
authors, courts have realized that traditional copyright concepts are
strained when applied to the technology of the Internet.
2
One particularly difficult application of copyright law to the Internet
involves the practice of "linking" different Web sites with the use of
hyperlinks." 3 This issue involves not only the hyperlink contained on a
Web site but the act of hyperlinking itself. Because hyperlinking allows
the connection of one Web site to another, 4 the question arises: if an
individual creates a hyperlink to a Web site, has that individual violated
the copyright of that site's author? The answer to this question is
particularly meaningful for authors publishing on the Internet. Recently,
some of the major news organizations sued a Web news service that
1. Cyberspace: The Legal Frontier, LAW., May 6, 1997, at 10.
2. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-
66.8 (1997).
3. Hyperlinking is also referred to as linking, links, or hypertext links; such terms are used
interchangeably in this Comment. See discussion infra note 23 and accompanying text.
Although hyperlinking is actually a characteristic of the World Wide Web (the "Web"), Internet
and Web concepts are used synonymously because both use the same "language" in transmitting
files and documents. For further discussion on the language of the Internet and the Web, see
discussion infra note 11 and accompanying text.
4. WEB-LINKING AGREEMENTS 1 (ABA ed., 1997). A "Web site" is a group of documents
located on a computer network connected to the Internet. It may contain text, graphics, or both,
and some sites may include sound and video. Although a Web site may consist of only one
document (or "page"), a Web site usually consists of many individual Web documents or pages.
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established links to the organizations' Web sites,5 claiming that the Web
news service misappropriated material from the Web sites through the use
of hyperlinks.6 Even though the parties reached an out-of-court settlement,
the case revealed the potential for copyright infringement claims arising
from the use of hyperlinks.7
This Comment argues that hyperlinking, the principal means by
which computer users browse through Web sites and access information
on the Internet,8 constitutes a copyright infringement. Unfortunately, the
current Copyright Act inadequately protects the rights of authors on the
Internet. Although increased protection may impede the progress of the
Internet, inasmuch as prohibiting or limiting hyperlinking decreases its
overall efficiency, offering better copyright protection to authors will
increase the use of the Internet as a medium of expression. This process
will both further the goals of the Copyright Act and promoting the Internet
itself.9
Part II briefly discusses the history and use of the Internet and the
World Wide Web. Part III explains the principles of copyright law
applicable to the Internet and Web site publishing. Part IV applies
copyright law to hyperlinking and argues that unauthorized hyperlinking
constitutes copyright infringement. Part V concludes that the Copyright
Act of 197610 is inadequate to protect the rights of Internet authors against
unlawful linking, and recommends that the Act must be amended to deal
effectively with this recent copyright challenge on the Internet.
5. See Washington Post Co. v. TotaINEWS, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 7,
1997); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
6. See Washington Post Complaint 10, available in Frames Technology: The Internet
Equivalent of Pirating?, L.J. EXTRA ON-LINE (visited Aug. 7, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/
internet.complain.html> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal)
[hereinafter Washington Post Complaint]; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
8. Kenneth Freeling & Joseph E. Levi, Frame Liability Clouds the Internet's Future:
Lawsuit Protests Web Programming Trick, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1997, at S5.
The ubiquitous hyperlink has become essential to the success of the Web as both
an information resource and a financially profitable medium. Indeed, some of the
most popular and successful Web sites... provide directories of links to Web
pages organized by topic .... For sites that hope to generate advertising
revenues, the more visitors, the greater the potential payoff.
Id.
"Browsing" involves the act of visiting various Web sites through hyperlinks. Id. It is
colloquially referred to as "surfing the Net." See Martin H. Samson, Hyperlink at Your Own
Risk, N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1997, at 1.
9. Kurt Kleiner, Surfing Prohibited, NEW SCIENTIsT, Jan. 25, 1997, at 28.
10. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1994)).
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Whereas the Internet is associated with the interconnection of various
computer networks, the World Wide Web 0te "Web") is regarded as the
system of information within the Internet. The Web's simplicity and
interactive format have facilitated the use of the Internet in our society.
Both individuals and organizations have established themselves on the
Internet by creating Web sites. While most Internet service providers
("ISPs") charge a fee for such service, 14 commercial sites can defray such
costs by selling advertisements on their site.'
5
B. Accessing a Web Site
The location of every Web site is designated by a specific sequence
of alphanumeric characters known as a Uniform Resource Locator
("URL"). 6 Although a Web site can be accessed by manually inputting its
URL, hyperlinking remains the most common way to access a site.
17
Hyperlinking involves the placement of an icon on a Web site that when
"clicked" calls up the URL of the destination site, causing that Web page
to appear on the user's screen.18
However, a Web site cannot be accessed without the use of a Web
client or browser.' 9 A Web browser is a program that retrieves documents
13. Id. at 832. Because the Web recognizes more than one protocol, different computers
operate as one large web of information. See discussion supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Tim Berners-Lee at CERN, the European Particle Physics Laboratory, began the Web
project in 1989. Kleiner, supra note 9, at 28. Berners-Lee attempted to find a way for
researchers to share information and ideas world-wide. HESLOP & BUDNICK, supra note 11, at
28. The project was referred to as the Hypertext Project. Id. "Hypertext" refers to the text
containing links to other documents contained on the Internet. Id.; Freeling & Levi, supra note
8, at S5. A person may "click" on a hypertext link to obtain more information on a subject.
HESLOP & BUDNICK, supra note 11, at 4; Kleiner, supra note 9, at 28.
14. HESLOP & BuDNiCK, supra note 11, at 21.
15. Linda Himelstein, Web Ads Start to Click, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 1997, at 130.
16. A URL usually consists of (1) the type of transfer protocol used, (2) the server, and (3)
the document's name or file name. One of the most common protocols is HTTP. See discussion
supra note 11 and accompanying text. For example, a typical URL for a Web site may appear
as http://www.internet.com/basics.html. The "http" indicates the type of protocol used to
retrieve and send the document. The "internet.com" is the server on which the document is
located, and "basics.html" is the name of the document or file. In addition, a URL may also
include the directory containing the Web document. In the URL, http://www.internet.coml
intro/basics.html, "intro" is the directory location for the document (or page) "basics.html."
17. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Dangerous Liaisons. The Legal Risks of Linking
Web Sites, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 1997, at 3.
18. Before the introduction of hyperlinks, Internet users relied on file indexes and keyword
searches to locate information. Today, hyperlinks have simplified this process to the "click" of
a button. See Kleiner, supra note 9, at 28.
19. HEsLoP & BuDNICK, supra note 11, at 7. In 1992, the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications ("NCSA") introduced the first Web browser, Mosaic. The
PARP-SITES
II. BACKGROUND
Before considering the legal issues raised by hyperlinks, it is
necessary to understand the development of the Internet as a
communications medium. Such a review reveals how the Internet raises a
problem for courts in balancing the interests of the public and the rights of
authors.
A. The Internet and the World Wide Web
The Internet is not easily defined. Technically, it is not a single
network but "a network of networks," connecting local area networks
("LANs") and wide area networks ("WANs") together. 1 This connection
of various systems has transformed the Internet into a global
communications medium. Over the past few years, corporations,
universities, non-profit organizations, and government agencies have each
contributed to the Internet's development by making it more accessible to
the public. 12
11. See DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 54 (1995) (footnotes omitted). A LAN
is a group of computers connected over a short distance; whereas, a WAN is a group of
computers connected over a long distance. Id. For example, a corporation may have a LAN to
facilitate the exchange of information within a single office, but it may also have a WAN to
allow communications with its foreign branches. A "network" is a "system of computers,
terminals, and databases connected by communication lines." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 794 (9th ed. 1991) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
Since the networks connected to the Internet may not be compatible, networks
communicate by way of protocols. BRENT HESLOP & LARRY BUDNICK, HTML PUBLISHING ON
THE INTERNET FOR WINDowS 4 (1995). A protocol is the language and rules by which
computers communicate with each other. Id. The underlying protocol for the Internet is known
as Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP"). The Web includes various
protocols: File Transfer Protocol ("FTP"), Telnet, Gopher, Wide-Area Information Servers
("WAIS"), and more. Id. The protocol used for accessing Web documents is Hypertext
Transfer Protocol ("HTIP"). Id. at 10.
12. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing the accessibility
of the Internet in the context of reviewing the Communications Decency Act of 1996).
Universities often provide connections to the Internet through computer centers and campus
libraries, where the Internet has become an invaluable educational resource. Id. Corporations
may allow access to the Internet for research purposes or to facilitate the exchange of
information. Id. at 833. If individuals do not otherwise have access at school or at work, they
can sign up with an Internet service provider ("ISP"), a company that charges a fee for access to
the Internet. Id. at 832-33. Commercial on-line providers, such as America Online,
CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy, have also included Internet access as an
additional service. Some communities have created "free-nets" or local networks that provide
Internet access for their citizens. Id. at 833. Additionally, some coffee houses offer customers
access to the Internet. Id.
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or files from a Web server or host computer. A Web server is a program
that sends the file or Web document after it has been requested by a
browser.
21
Using hypertext markup language ("HTML"), 22 three types of links
can be created: (1) intra-page links; (2) intra-system links; and (3) inter-
system links.23 Such links are created by simply using a HTML linking
command and the URL for a destination site.24  Furthermore, when
hyperlinking to another Web site, the author of a linking site often creates
a "direct link" to that site.25  Once activated, a direct link transfers an
Internet user to the destination site.26 This method of hyperlinking allows
the viewing of only one site at a time.
27
A second method of linking Web sites is framing. Framing allows a
person to link to another Web site while maintaining the original site on
the user's screen. 2 A framing site appears as multiple windows with each
beginning of the Web's popularity is attributed to Mosaic. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 7. A server or host computer is connected to the Internet. See generally
RICHARD K. SWADLEY, THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 43 (1995) (discussing how computers and
networks are connected to the Internet).
21. Id. at 6. A Web server is contained on a server or host computer.
22. HESLOP & BUDNIcK, supra note 11, at 7. "HTML" is the formatting language for
creating a Web document. Id.
23. Id. at 139. Intra-page links connect to other parts of the same Web site. Id. Intra-
system links connect to other Web sites on the same server. Id. Inter-system links connect to a
Web site on another server. Id. In a Web site's HTML code, a link is written as either a
hypertext reference ("HREF") link or image ("IMG") link. Raysman & Brown, supra note 17,
at 3.
In a Web site's HTML code, for example, a HREF link appears as <A
HREF="http://www.intemet.com/basics.htrnl">Intemet Basics</A>. ELIZABETH CASTRO,
HTML FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB 93 (2d ed. 1997). Similarly an IMG link appears as <A
HREF="http://www.intemet.com/basics.html"><IMG SRC="basics.gif></A>. Id. at 102. On
a Web page, however, a hyperlink appears as a highlighted word or phrase. It may also be
embedded in an image attributable to the destination site.
24. The linking command or HTML command is contained in the source code or HTML
code of the linking site. The "source code" or "HTML code" refers to the formatting for a Web
document. In fact, a person can view the source code for a Web site with a browser. With the
Web browser Netscape Navigator, a person simply clicks on "Document Source" under the
View Menu. CASTRO, supra note 23, at 208.
25. This method of hyperlinking will be referred to as a direct link. It differs from other
methods of linking that are discussed later.
26. Raysman & Brown, supra note 17, at 3.
27. Id.
28. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5; see also Use of Frames to Incorporate Third-
Party Content in Web Site Sparks Controversy, COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, Mar. 1997, at 8
[hereinafter Use of Frames] ("Framing allows web authors to divide web pages into multiple,
scrollable regions and windows that may operate independently of each other. Using this
technique, web authors.., allow viewers to look 'through' one site to another, without ever
terminating the connection to the linking site.").
1998]
366 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 18
window containing the contents of a destination site. With framing, a site
owner can incorporate parts of or entire Web sites produced by others, as
well as include its own advertising, logos, or promotions.29 The parasitic
nature of a framing site allows users to rely on one site for accessing
another related site. Moreover, considering the market for advertising on
the Internet, framing sites allow users to avoid visiting the destination site
directly, costing advertisers on that site potential customers.
C. Are You Linking to Me?
In 1997, commercial publishers brought to the forefront the issue of
copyright infringement through the use of hyperlinks. 30 Recognizing the
Web's increasing popularity, many publishers have established Web sites
containing articles from their print publications.3 1 These companies are
now challenging the unauthorized practice of hyperlinking to their sites by
other Web sites, particularly other commercial sites. The destination sites
object to the linking sites or link providers profiting from hyperlinking to
the destination sites. More specifically, framing sites allow Internet users
to circumvent the advertising on the framed sites. Because material on the
framing sites typically occupy most of the user's screen, any
advertisements on the framed destination sites are either obscured or
hidden. Thus, advertisements on the destination sites are functionally
replaced by those on the linking site. Consequently, framing sites attract
advertising revenue away from the destination sites.
29. Use of Frames, supra note 28, at 8.
30. In the United States, there have been only two cases to date involving claims against
unauthorized hyperlinks. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97 Civ. 3055 (C.D.
Cal. filed Apr. 28, 1997); Washington Post Co. v. TotaINEWS, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Feb. 7, 1997). The Ticketmaster case is not discussed in this Comment because it involves
the issue of linking as a matter of trademark infringement. Ticketmaster charged Microsoft with
wrongfully misappropriating and misusing Ticketmaster's name and trademarks, diluting the
value of Ticketmaster's name, trademarks, and business. See Ticketmaster Complaint 3,
available in Web Suit, L.J. EXTRA ON-LINE (visited Aug. 7, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/ljxfiles/
ticketmaster/complaint.html> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Journal). Nonetheless, the mere existence of this case further supports the significance of the
hyperlinking controversy. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 for an analysis of TotaINEWS.
31. SwADLEY, supra note 20, at 35.
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III. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Overview of Copyright Law
Although the history of copyright law can be characterized as a
continuous response to technological advancements, 32 the Constitutional
Convention did not adojpt the copyright clause in the Constitution as a
response to technology. The Framers of the Constitution recognized that
authors would be motivated to create works if given an economic
incentive, such as the exclusive right to reproduce their works.34  Thus,
Congress has enacted various copyright statutes granting authors exclusive
rights in their work. However, even though a work is afforded copyright
protection, Congress has provided many statutory limitations and
exceptions for the public's use of such work. 
5
B. Requirements for Copyright Protection
The requirements for copyright protection are minimal. For works
created after January 1, 1978, an author of a work receives copyright
protection even though he or she has not registered the work with the
32. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 7 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter the WHITE PAPER].
Changes in technology generate new industries and new methods for reproduction
and dissemination of works of authorship, which may present new opportunities
for authors, but also create additional challenges. Copyright has had to respond to
those challenges, from Gutenberg's moveable type printing press to digital audio
recorders and everything in between-photocopiers, radio, television,
videocassette recorders, cable television and satellites.
Id.
33. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03[A], at 1-66.7.
34. Id. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court declared: "The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the
useful Arts."' Id. at 219. Later, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151
(1975), the Court stated:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability to literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
Id. at 156.
35. See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-21 (1994); see discussion infra Part III.E.
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Copyright Office.36  Under section 102(a) of the Copyright Act,
"[c]opyright protection [applies to] ... original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression. .... " Hence, copyright protection
requires: (1) work of authorship; (2) fixation; and (3) originality.
1. Work of Authorship
The Copyright Act delineates works of authorship into eight broad
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.38  Although the work of
authorship requirement is merely a classification of a work, how a work is
categorized affects the rights granted to a copyright owner.39
2. Fixation
Perhaps the easiest requirement to satisfy is the requirement that a
work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression-the "writings"
requirement. 40  The Supreme Court has interpreted the "writings"
requirement to mean "any physical rendering" of an author's work.
4 1
36. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 7.16[A][1], at 7-148. While the mere
registration of a work in the Copyright Office does not create a copyright, it confers on an
author certain advantages: (1) it establishes a public record of the ownership of a copyright; (2)
it establishes prima facie validity of the copyright; (3) it allows a copyright owner a broader
range of remedies; and, most importantly, (4) it secures the right to file an infringement suit. Id.
§ 12.08, at 12-125. After the Berne Convention Amendments, registration is not required to
bring an infringement suit. The Berne Convention prohibits imposition of formalities as a
prerequisite for copyright protection. Id. § 7.16[B][1][b], at 7-161.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
38. Id. For purposes of this Comment, it is not necessary to discuss all the works of
authorship. For further discussion on the other types of "works of authorship," see 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 2, §§ 2.04-2.11, at 2-44 to 2-172.15.
39. See discussion infra Part IH.C.
40. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.08[B], at 1-66.25. The "writings" requirement
is derived from the copyright clause in the Constitution. The United States Constitution
provides: "Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Writings and
Discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) ("'Writings' ... [are not] construed
in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of
constitutional principles."). In Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921),
Judge Learned Hand provided the standard for the constitutional interpretation of the "writings"
requirement:
[The Copyright Clause's] grants of power to Congress compromise, not only what
was then known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter. Of
course, the new subject-matter must have some relation to the grant; but we
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Thus, the fixation requirement is met when an author embodies his or her
work on a material object, such as a piece of paper, a canvas, or a
computer's hard drive.
3. Originality
Originality is not defined in the Copyright Act, and thus, it is
necessary to look to the case law for guidance. In Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,42 the Supreme Court held that originality
consists of (1) minimal creativity and (2) independent creation.43 In Feist,
Rural Telephone provided telephone service to several communities in
northwest Kansas and published white pages containing an alphabetical
listing of subscribers' names, towns, and telephone numbers.44 Feist also
published telephone books and tried unsuccessfully to license Rural
Telephone's list of names.4 5 Without Rural Telephone's consent, Feist
copied approximately 1300 names and numbers from Rural Telephone's
white pages, including four fictitious listings that Rural Telephone inserted
to detect copying by competitors.
46
The Supreme Court found that Rural Telephone's copyright in its
telephone directory did not protect the names and numbers copied by
Feist.4 7 In delivering the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor relied on the
constitutional principle that a protected work must be original.48
O'Connor stated that "original" means a work has a minimal level of
creativity.49 The Court further recognized that facts in and of themselves
are not copyrightable, and thus, the facts underlying a work can be freely
copied. On the other hand, the Court held that factual compilations may
possess the requisite originality.5 1  It held that Rural Telephone's
alphabetical listing of telephone subscribers and their numbers was not
interpret it by the general practices of civilized peoples in similar fields, for it is
not a strait-jacket, but a charter for a living people.
Id. at 719.
42. 499 U.S. 340 (1990).
43. Id. at 345 ("Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it
closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.").
44. Id. at 342.
45. Id. at 343.
46. Id. at 342-43.
47. Id. at 361.
48. 499 U.S. at 345.
49. Id. at 346.
50. Id. at 348.
51. Id. at 345.
1998]
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copyrightable as a compilation because it did not possess the minimum
creativity to constitute an original work of authorship.
5 2
This decision is significant not only for its clarification of the
originality requirement, but also for its implications for the copyright
protection afforded to lesser works of authorship, such as factual
compilations. The Court concluded that factual compilations receive
"thin" copyright protection.5 3  Nonetheless, any distinguishable and
meaningful variation from an underlying work should satisfy the Court's
originality requirement.
The Feist Court also required that a work be independently created to
satisfy the originality requirement.54 Judge Learned Hand best expressed
this concept: "[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to
compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he -would be an 'author,'
and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats's [public domain poem]." 55 In short, an author
must not have copied another work.
C. Exclusive Rights Under Copyright Law
The copyright law grants certain exclusive rights to the owner of a
copyright. Section 106 provides the owner of a copyright the exclusive
right to: (1) reproduce the work; (2) prepare derivative works; (3)
distribute copies of the work; (4) perform the work publicly; and (5)
publicly display the work.56 However, the owner of a copyright is not
necessarily entitled to all of the exclusive rights57 because certain works of
authorship may not involve a performance or display right.
58
1. Reproduction Right
The right to reproduce a copyrighted work may be the most
fundamental right granted by copyright law. The reproduction right
52. Id. at 362.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
55. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
57. 2 NIMMER & NIMMEI, supra note 2, § 8.01[A], at 8-14.1 ("mT1he nature of rights
available to a copyright owner will often vary considerably depending upon the type of work
that has been copyrighted.").
58. Id. § 8.14[A], at 8-181. For instance, the copyright owner of a sculptural work is not
entitled to a performance right, because a sculpture cannot be "performed." Id.
59. Id. § 8.02[A], at 8-28.
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involves the ability to reproduce a work in "copies or phonorecords."6
This right should not be confused, however, with the concept of
"copying. ' 61 While reproduction occurs when an author fixes a work onto
a material object, copying may take place without fixation,62 such as the
unauthorized performance of a play.
2. Adaptation Right
The right to prepare derivative works63 enables a copyright owner to
exploit markets other than the one in which the work was first published.
For example, the motion picture rights to a best-selling novel may be a
more profitable derivative market. Accordingly, the adaptation right is
infringed when a third party makes an unauthorized derivative work in
which a pre-existing work is "recast, transformed, or adapted."64 While it
is unclear whether fixation is required for an infringement of the
adaptation right, Nimmer on Copyright, a leading treatise on copyright law,
argues that fixation should be required to infringe the adaptation right.
65
60. Id. Section 101 of the 1976 Act provides that '[c]opies' are material objects, other
than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101. "Phonorecords," on the other hand,
are defined as "material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
61. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.02[A], at 8-28; see discussion infra Part Ill.D.
concerning copyright infringement.
62. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.02[A], at 8-28; see discussion supra Part
III.B.2.
63. Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
64. Id.
65. 2 NIMimER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.09[B], at 8-128.4. In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
v. Nintendo ofAm., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit held that "[a] derivative
work must be fixed to be protected under the Act, but not to infringe." Id. at 968 (citation
omitted). Although this pronouncement constituted dictum, it nonetheless raised the issue of
whether a derivative work must be fixed in order to violate a copyright author's adaptation right.
See Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5.
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3. Distribution Right
The distribution right gives the copyright owner the right to control
the first public distribution of his or her work.66 The infringement of this
right requires an "actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords"
of the copyrighted work.67  Currently, the distribution right does not
include the transmission of copyrighted works, as discussed under the
performance and display rights.
4. Performance Right
The performance right is only available to certain works, such as
musical and dramatic works. As defined in section 101, "[tlo 'perform' a
work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process . . ,69 Thus, a performance includes not
only the initial rendition, but any further rendition that is distributed to the
public.7 For example, a person performs a work by reciting a poem,
singing a song, or playing a tape on a VCR. Similarly, a broadcaster
performs when he or she transmits a live performance or one contained on
a phonorecord.
A copyright owner's performance right is restricted, however, to
public performances. 7 1 Clearly, the drafters of the Copyright Act did not
intend to prohibit individuals from private performances in their own
72homes. As defined, a public performance is one that takes place in a
66. The public distribution of a work may be by sale, rental, lease, or lending. H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675.
67. 2 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11 [A], at 8-137.
68. Id. § 8.14[A], at 8-181.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
70. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675-76.
71. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.14[C], at 8-185.
72. Section 101 provides:
"[P]ublicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
public setting or before a public group.73 More importantly, a public
performance includes the transmission of a work.
74
5. Display Right
As with the performance right, the right to display a work is limited
to public displays. 5 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "display" as
"to show a copy of [a copyrighted work], either directly or by means of a
film, slide, television image, or any other device or process .... ,76 Thus,
while a series of still photographs of a film would not infringe the
performance right of the film's copyright owner, they would likely violate
the display right. Accordingly, since a Web site is more analogous to a
display of a copyrighted work, an Internet author may be entitled to a
display right rather than a performance right.77
D. Copyright Infringement
For a copyright owner to maintain a suit for copyright infringement,
he or she must prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright in the work; (2)S78
copying by the defendant; and (3) improper appropriation. To prove
ownership, a plaintiff's work must not have entered the public domain, or
failed to satisfy the formalities for copyright protection. Often, copying
by the defendant cannot be shown by direct evidence, and thus, a plaintiff
must offer circumstantial evidence of a defendant's copying, such as a
defendant's access to a plaintiffs work or similarity between the works.
8 0
Because a person cannot infringe a copyrs8ight if that person independently
created a copy of a plaintiffs work, as in Judge Learned Hand's
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 106.
76. Id. § 101.
77. The legislative history of 1976 Act broadly defines the display right to cover "the
projection of an image on a screen or other surface by any method, the transmission of an image
by electronic or other means, and the showing of an image on a cathode ray tube, or similar
viewing apparatus connected with any sort of information storage and retrieval system." H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5677.
78. 4 NMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.01, at 13-5, § 13.01 [B], at 13-9.
79. The formalities for copyright protection include fixation and originality. See
discussion supra note 36 and accompanying text. Registration of a work is prima facie evidence
of copyright ownership. Id.
80. Id. § 13.01[B], at 13-10 to 13-11.
81. See discussion supra Part 1I.B.3.
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example, proof of a defendant's access reduces the chance of finding
independent creation by a defendant.
8 2
In addition, a plaintiff could establish copying by proving a "striking
similarity" between the alleged copy and the original work.8 3  If a
defendant's work is overwhelmingly similar to a plaintiff's work, a trier of
fact can infer that the defendant could not have independently created the
infringing work. 84  Similarities between works that tend to prove actual
"copying" are called probative similarities.8 5
After satisfying the copying element, a plaintiff must prove improper
appropriation by showing that the infringing copy is "substantially similar"
to the copyrighted work. 6 Although courts have applied various tests in
determining substantial similarity,87 most courts agree that trivial
similarities are non-infringing. 88  Some courts have held, however, that
even a negligible yet qualitatively important taking of a copyrighted work
may constitute a substantial similarity.89  Therefore, while a defendant
need not copy the entire work to violate a copyright, a defendant must
copy enough to raise an actionable claim for infringement.
90
A defendant may be liable under any one of three types of
infringement: (1) direct infringement; (2) vicarious infringement; or (3)
82. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.01[B], at 13-15.
83. Id. § 13.02[B], at 13-22. A striking similarity means that "the similarities must be so
striking as to preclude the possibility that the defendant independently arrived at the same
result." Id. at 13-22 to 13-23.
84. Id.
85. 4 NIMSJER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.01[B], at 13-11. See generally Alan Latman,
"Probative Similarity" As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187, 1204 (1990) (suggesting that probative similarity be
attributed to copying as a factual matter and retaining substantial similarity to describe copying
as a legal proposition).
86. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A], at 13-27. Whereas a striking
similarity merely proves actual copying by a defendant, a finding of substantial similarity
indicates that such copying was improper.
87. Id. § 13.03[A][1[aHd], at 13-31 to 13-45.
88. Id. § 13.03[A], at 13-27.
89. See Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 624 n.14 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[A] copyright infringement may occur by reason of a substantial similarity that involves only
a small portion of each work .... "); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741, 744
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the defendant's copying, although slight, constituted a significant
part of the copyrighted work).
90. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A], at 13-28 ("[T]he test for infringement
of a copyright is of necessity vague ....") (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)). Nimmer on Copyright notes that the necessary
quantum of substantial similarity is unclear. Id. at 13-47. Inevitably, courts must engage in
line-drawing when analyzing the substantial similarity element.
contributory infringement. 91 Direct infringement occurs when a person
violates any one of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder.92 A court
does not look at whether the defendant had knowledge of the infringement
or that he or she intended to violate the rights of the copyright owner.
93
This standard of strict liability ensures the utmost protection of a copyright
owner's rights.
Vicarious infringement occurs when a third party is able to control or
supervise the acts of the direct infringer and derives a financial benefit
from the infringing acts.9 4  The third party need not participate in the
infringing act nor have knowledge of it to be liable for infringement. 95 For
instance, in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,96 the defendant
lessor was held liable for the infringing acts of his lessee, who sold pirated
records in the leased space.
97
Lastly, contributory infringement occurs when the third party knows
the infringement is taking place, and the third party participates
substantially in the infringing conduct.9 8 In Elektra Records Co. v. Gem
Electronic Distributors, Inc., for example, the court held the defendant
liable for contributory infringement for loaning customers tapes containing
copyrighted musical works and providing them with the means to make
91. James A. Kirkland, Emerging Internet Copyright Issues, in FIRST ANNUAL INTERNET
LAW INSTITUTE 531, 536 (PLI ed., 1997).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
93. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) ("Intent or
knowledge [to infringe] is not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is
liable for infringement .... ); see also Kirkland, supra note 91, at 536.
94. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). The court
stated in Shapiro:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the absence
of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired-the purposes
of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the
beneficiary of that exploitation.
Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 307.
96. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
97. Id. at 306.
98. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 486 (1984); see
also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968) ("[The] mere
quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability .... Rather,
resolution of the issue . . . depends upon a determination of the function that [the alleged
infringer] plays in the total [reproduction] process .... "); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer") (footnote omitted).
99. 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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copies.100  In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,'Dl found the manufacturer of a Betamax
machine not liable as a contributory infringer for the taping of television
programs by the VCR owner. 102 The Supreme Court concluded that the
manufacturers of "staple articles of commerce" having substantial non-
infringing uses cannot be held liable as contributory infringers. 10 3
E. Fair Use Defense to Copyright Infringement
Even after a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of copyright
infringement, a defendant may not be liable if the copy qualifies as a "fair
use" of the original work. 04 Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, a
court must balance four nonexclusive factors in determining fair use: (1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality copied of the work; and (4) the
effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work.105 While there is
no bright-line rule for determining fair use, section 107 also considers
certain uses as inherently fair, specifically reproduction of a copyrighted
work for the purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching...
scholarship, or research .... ,106 However, because the fair use analysis
looks to the facts and circumstances of each case, 10 7 it does not lend itself
to predictable results.
100. Id.
101. See 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
102. Id. at 456.
103. Id. at 442.
104. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05, at 13-149.
105. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
107. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][ll[c], at 13-154. The court in
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
summarized this concept:
Fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all of the evidence, and among
other elements entering into the determination of the issue, are the extent and
relative value of copyrighted material, and the effect upon the distribution of
objects of the original work .... Whether a particular use of a copyrighted
article, without permission of the owner, is a fair use, depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case, and the court must look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of material used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects of the original work ....
Id. at 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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1. Purpose and Character of Use
Courts typically focus on the commercial nature of the defendant's
usage in determining fair use.I08 If a defendant's copying is for economic
gain, a presumption against fair use arises.'1 9  While a finding of
commerciality is not dispositive of the fair use issue, a court is less likely
to find a fair use privilege when a defendant profits from the copyrighted
author's efforts. I  Some courts also look at purposes other than a
defendant's profit motive, particularly bad faith.' 1' Intuitively, a use made
in bad faith is inconsistent with this privilege because an assumption of
good faith and fair dealing underlies a fair use.!12
2. Nature of Copyrighted Work
The inquiry into the nature of the work presumes that the public
should have more access to certain works than others. 113  If a work is
factual in nature, as opposed to a work that is creative, courts are more
willing to find a fair use.114 In addition, a work that is unavailable or out-
of-print is more susceptible to a fair use privilege.'' 5  The public has a
greater interest in a work that is not widely disseminated. In contrast, an
unpublished work does not receive the full extent of the fair use116
privilege. An author's right to control the initial distribution of his or
her work may outweigh a defense of fair use.117 Accordingly, a court must
reconcile such interests when examining this factor.
108. 4 NIMAER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][1][c], at 13-160.
109. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 ("[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright .... ).
110. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 13.05[A][1][c], at 13-161; cf Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir.
1992); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (holding defendant
engaged in commercial use of copyrighted material even though customers used material for
personal purposes).
111. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 4 NMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A], at 13-72.
112. Time, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
113. 4 NIMlER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][2][a], at 13-168.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 13.05[A][2][b], at 13-172.
116. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554.
117. Id.
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3. Amount and Substantiality of Use
Additionally, a court must analy'ze whether a defendant has
excessively copied a plaintiff's work. While a verbatim copy may
qualify as excessive per se, this factor also depends on the purpose and
character of a defendant's use. 119  For instance, in reviewing a book, a
literary critic would be inclined to quote substantially from its passages.
Although a fair use would likely apply to such copying, a person must be
mindful to not fulfill the market demand for a plaintiffs work with his or
her copy. Moreover, courts analyze this factor from both a quantitative as
well as qualitative perspective. Thus, although a defendant may copy an
insignificant amount of a plaintiff s work, he or she could still be liable for
infringement if the amount copied represented the work's substance.1
22
4. Effect of Use on Market for Work
Finally, courts frequently cite the market effect factor as the most
important in determining fair use. 123 If the market for a copyrighted work
is eliminated, the author has no economic incentive to create other works.
For that reason, a court's analysis may be strongly motivated by this
factor. Furthermore, in examining the impact on the market, courts focus124
on the potential, rather than the actual, harm. Accordingly, a court will
also look at the effect on the derivative markets for a plaintiffs work. 12
F. Implied License Defense to Copyright Infringement
If an alleged infringer lacks a fair use defense, a defendant could
assert that he or she holds a nonexclusive license, or more specifically an
implied license to use the work. Typically, a transfer of copyright
118. This factor should not be confused with substantial similarity under copyright
infringement. Since a defendant only asserts a fair use defense after a finding of copyright
infringement, this factor is not analyzed until a plaintiff proves substantial similarities between
the defendant's infringing work and plaintiff's copyrighted work.
119. 4 NIMvER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[AI[3], at 13-178.
120. This factor is closely related to the market effect factor discussed below. 4 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][3], at 13-178; see Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th
Cir. 1986).
121. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][3], at 13-178.
122. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
123. Id. at 566 ("This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use."); 4 NIDMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-180.
124. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-181.
125. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 ("[Fair use analysis] must take account not only of
harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.").
ownership requires a writing by the copyright owner and the licensee.'
26
However, the Copyright Act does not recognize a nonexclusive license as a
transfer of copyright ownership. 127  Thus, by negative inference, a
nonexclusive license may be granted orally or implied by conduct. 128 In
Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen,129 for instance, the Ninth Circuit held
that because Effects had delivered a copy of its work to the defendant for
distribution, the defendant had received a nonexclusive implied 
license. 130
However, an implied license may be qualified in its terms. Just as an
implied license may arise by a party's conduct, the terms of the license are
determined by the facts and circumstances of each situation. 13 1 Thus, even
though a person has implicit authority to use the copyrighted work, that
person can still violate a copyright by exceeding the terms of the
license. 132 Accordingly, the question arises of what license, if any, can be
inferred from the existence of a Web site on the Internet. If a license does
exist, its precise terms and scope must be determined as well.
IV. HYPERLINKS INFRINGE THE COPYRIGHT OF WEB SITES
Within the context of the Internet, two possible copyright
infringements exist. First, the hyperlink itself, inasmuch as it represents
the specific and unique URL of a destination site, may violate the
copyright of that destination site. For example, assuming a business can
copyright the URL for its Web site, a person placing that URL into a
directory without permission would infringe the business' copyright in its
URL.
126. 2 NIMMER & NIMMFR, supra note 2, § 10.03[A][7], at 10-43.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The 1976 Act defines a "transfer of copyright ownership" as
"an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether
or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." Id.
128. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 10.03[A][7], at 10-44; Effects Assocs., Inc. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990); see Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp.,
36 F.3d 1147, 1167 n.35 (1st Cir. 1994); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-
Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1991); Ladas v. Potpourri Press, Inc., 846 F. Supp.
221, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 627
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
Love v. Kwitny, 706 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Silva v. MacLaine, 697 F. Supp.
1423, 1430 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Econs. Co., 548 F. Supp.
1231 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
129. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
130. Id. at 559.
131. Allen R. Grogan, Implied Licensing Issues in the Online World, 8 COMPUTER LAW. 1,
2(1997).
132. Id. at 3.
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Second, the act of hyperlinking, inasmuch as it reproduces the entire
destination site on the user's screen, may constitute an infringement. For
example, if an author incorporates another author's short story within his
or her novel and without that author's consent, such use would infringe the
copyright in that short story.
A. What Is Copyrightable?
Before considering whether an infringement has occurred, one must
first determine what copyright, if any, is being infringed. If the hyperlink
itself raises the infringement claim, the issue becomes whether the
destination site's URL is copyrightable. However, if the act of
hyperlinking causes the infringement, a court must determine whether the
contents of the destination site are copyrightable.
1. The Hyperlink and the URL
a. Work of Authorship
Because a URL consists of alphanumeric characters, it qualifies as a
"literary work." Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "literary works"
as those "other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied."
133
Such a broad definition encompasses URLs as a literary work of
authorship. 
134
b. Fixation
For the destination site's URL to be copyrihtable, it must satisfy
both the fixation and originality requirements. The first inquiry is
whether a URL is fixed on a tangible medium of expression. Since a URL
is physically located on a server's hard drive, a URL satisfies the fixationS 136 ...
requirement. The second inquiry is whether a URL has the requisite
133. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
134. Raysman & Brown, supra note 17, at 3.
135. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 regarding a URL as a literary work.
136. Russell Shaw, Copyright Law: It Applies to the Web, Too, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Apr. 11, 1997, at Al.
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"modicum of creativity" for originality. This question is not as clearly
answered as the fixation requirement.
c. Fact or Original?
A URL does not have the requisite originality under copyright law
137
because it would likely be construed as a fact under the holding in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 13  The Feist Court
provided that a fact is not copyrightable because "facts do not owe their
origin to an act of authorship."' 9  While a person may copright the
particular expression of a fact, the fact itself is not copyrightable.
A URL is the Internet equivalent of the addresses in Feist.141  It
designates the location for a Web site on the Internet, and thus, it consists
of no meaningful or creative component protectable by copyright law.
142
Moreover, a URL does not owe its origin to an act of authorship. Because
a hyperlink itself "coies" only a Web site's URL, 143 it does not infringe
that site's copyright. For an infringement claim, a defendant must copy
"[the] constituent elements of the work that are original.
Consequently, a link provider is not liable for infringement by creating a
hyperlink. 146
137. Home Sweet Home: An On-line Discussion of Copyright Issues Raised by the
Creation of 'Home Pages,'LEGAL TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 39 [hereinafter Home Sweet Home];
Raysman & Brown, supra note 17, at 3.
138. Charles R. Merrill & Robert J. Burger, Keeping the Chain Unbroken (visited Aug. 7,
1997) <http://www.ipmag.com/merrill.htm1>.
139. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 449 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
140. Id. at 349.
141. Home Sweet Home, supra note 137, at 39; Raysman & Brown, supra note 17, at 3.
142. Id.
143. See discussion supra Part II.C.; see also discussion supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
144. Home Sweet Home, supra note 137, at 39.
145. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
146. Interestingly, although the URLs themselves are not copyrightable, if one applies the
Court's reasoning in Feist, an arrangement of hyperlinks may be copyrightable as a compilation
of facts. See Matt Jackson, Linking Copyright to Home Pages, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 731, 742
(1997); Raysman & Brown, supra note 17, at 3; Home Sweet Home, supra note 137, at 39; see
generally 17 U.S.C. § 101. For example, if-a Web site selected and organized a group of
hyperlinks that satisfied copyright requirements, another Web site may not copy such
compilation, but it could use the underlying URLs. Thus, while the compilation does not
change the copyright status of the URLs, copyright protects the list of hyperlinks, which is
essentially an arrangement of URLs. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51.
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2. The Act of Hyperlinking
Even though copyright does not extend to a destination site's URL, it
can protect the contents of such site as a "literary work." For example, if
the link provider simply placed copies of the publishers' printed articles on
the Internet rather than linked to their Web sites, the publishers could
easily assert their proprietary rights under copyright law. 147  In other
words, a Web site does not differ significantly from a print publication
other than the type of medium.14 8 Assuming the contents of a destination
site are sufficiently original, fixation is satisfied by a Web site's storage on
a server's hard drive. 149 The Los Angeles Times, for instance, could claim
copyright protection in the stories appearing on its Web site just as it could
for its newspaper articles. Thus, because the act of hyperlinking
reproduces the contents of a destination site on a user's computer, the
copyright owner could bring a claim for copyright infringement.
B. The Act of Hyperlinking Infringes the Copyright of Web Sites
1. Direct Links
A direct link infringes the copyright of a Web site if the act of
hyperlinking actually copies the destination site's contents, resulting in an
improper appropriation. A direct link satisfies the copying element,
because a hyperlink places a copy of the destination site on a user's152
computer. More specifically, once an Internet user clicks on a hyperlinkicon, the browser connects to the server specified in the URL of the
147. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). While courts
may have settled the issue of unauthorized copies on the Internet, it remains unclear what
liability ISPs and commercial on-line services should bear for a subscriber's infringing activity.
Currently, Congress is contemplating legislation that would alter the traditional standards for
vicarious and contributory liability to apply more appropriately to ISPs. See On-Line Copyright
Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997); Digital Copyright Clarification &
Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997). This issue is outside the
scope of this Comment.
148. Lance Rose, World Wide Web Can Ensnare Unwary Users; Potential Copyright
Problems Abound, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1995, at S3; Daniel W. McDonald et al., Intellectual
Property and the Internet, 12 CoMPUTER LAW. 8 (1996).
149. McDonald, supra note 148, at 8.
150. Paul Gibbons & Lauren Gibbons, It's the World's Biggest Copy Machine, PC WK.,
Jan. 27, 1997, at 109.
151. See discussion supra Part IIL.E.
152. Id.
destination site.1 53  The Web server then transmits a copy of the
destination site to the user's computer, downloading the Web document
into the computer's RAM. 154 In addition, the function of a hyperlink
conveniently resolves the issue of improper appropriation.1 55 The RAM
copy is substantially similar to, if not an exact duplicate of, the destination
site. The analysis becomes complicated when one considers whether the
RAM copy is "fixed" on the user's computer.
Clearly, the fixation requirement for copyright protection must apply
to a defendant's infringing copy, otherwise there has been no infringement
of the original work. I Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a work
as fixed "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord ... is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 157  In
addition, a "copy" is a "material object[], other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."'
158
While a RAM copy is contained on a material object, it is removed from
the user's RAM when the computer is turned off.'59 Thus, the question
arises as to whether a RAM copy is sufficiently permanent or stable.
Considering that most users merely browse on the Internet, a RAM
copy may not be adequately "fixed" for purposes of infringement.
160
Rather, one could argue that the copy resides on the user's computer for
only a transitory duration. This issue undoubtedly turns on how a court
interprets the fixation requirement for copyright infringement.
16'
153. Id. at 9.
154. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5 ("When a user clicks on the link, Web browser
software automatically retrieves the corresponding document and creates a copy which is then
displayed on the user's screen."). "RAM" refers to random-access memory: the computer
memory that provides the main internal storage for programs and data. WEBSTER'S, supra note
11, at 974.
155. Gibbons & Gibbons, supra note 150, at 109.
156. 2 NIMMER & N0MMER, supra note 2, § 8.02[B][3], at 8-30.
157. Id.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
159. Jackson, supra note 146, at 742.
160. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Although the Netcom court provided that browsing is the
functional equivalent of reading, it indicated that an Internet user could infringe a copyright by
saving the RAM copy. Id.
161. One should not confuse this fixation requirement with the requirement of fixation for
copyright protection. The former concerns whether a copy has been made, while the latter
involves the creation of the original work. See discussion supra Part Ill.B.2.
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Based on the Ninth Circuit's holding in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.,162 a copy created by a hyperlink is sufficiently "fixed" for
an infringement claim. MAI Systems Corp. ("MAI") manufactured
computers and designed software to run those computers, 164 servicing both
the computers and the software necessary to operate them. 165 Its software
included the operating system required to run any other program on the
computer.
The defendant, Peak Computer, Inc. ("Peak"), also maintained
computer systems, including MAI computers, for its clients. Peak's
service of MAI computers entailed routine maintenance and emergency
repairs. 166 At times, the Peak technician operated the computer and its
software in order to service the machine. 16 7 MAI claimed that this process
infringed the cop66ights in its software by loading a copy into the
computer's RAM. While Peak conceded that fact, it asserted that the• • •169
RAM copy was not sufficiently fixed to constitute an infringement.
Although the court failed to find a case specifically holding that the
copying of software into RAM created an infringing copy,170 it found some
authority for the proposition that the act of loading a program from a
storage medium to a computer's memory generally resulted in a copy of
that program. 17 1 Furthermore, such authority did not expressly provide
that a copy is produced irrespective of whether the software is loaded into
RAM or on the computer's hard drive. Relying on the definition of
"fixed" in the Copyright Act, however, the court held that an unauthorized
copy created in RAM constituted infringement because such copy can be
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated." 172 Consequently,
the MAI court held that a copy residing in RAM is "fixed" for purposes of
copyright infringement.1
7 3
162. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 513.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 519.
167. Id. at 518.
168. MAM, 991 F.2d at 518.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 519.
171. Id. (citing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988));
see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.08, at 8-105 ("Inputting a computer program
entails the preparation of a copy.").
172. M,, 991 F.2d at 519 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
173. Id.
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Accordingly, under the Ninth Circuit's holding in MA/, the
unauthorized copy resulting from the act of hyperlinking is an
infringement of the destination site's copyright. 174 In MAI, a copy of the
plaintiff's operating system software was loaded into RAM when the
computer was turned on. 175 Similarly, a RAM copy of a destination site's
contents is created when an Internet user activates a hyperlink. 76  In
addition, the RAM copy can be perceived on a user's screen as well as
copied onto the user's hard drive. 7 7 Because no court has applied the MAI
decision to Internet copying, a question remains as to whether an Internet
user must "fix" a copy of the Web site to a more tangible medium than
RAM. 178
a. What Exclusive Rights Are Involved?
The next inquiry is what exclusive rights are involved and which
rights are infringed by a direct link. Consistent with the holding in MA/, a
RAM copy infringes a destination site's reproduction right.1
79
Furthermore, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,18S the court found that
placing unauthorized copies of a work on the Internet implicated the
copyright owner's distribution right.' Whether hyperlinking also
involves an infringement of the distribution right is unclear, however,
because the linking site merely provides a connection to the copyright
owner's Web site. The copyright owner placed the contents of the
destination site on the Web.
Moreover, there has been no infringement of the adaptation right. A
direct link does not recast or alter the plaintiff's Web site in any way;
instead, it is an exact duplicate of the destination site.182 Finally, based on
the holding in Playboy Enterprises, the act of hyperlinking implicates the
display right rather than the performance right, and because the definition
174. Other courts have followed the holding in MAI. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 255;
Advanced Computer Serv. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
175. MAI, 991 F.2d at 518.
176. Gibbons & Gibbons, supra note 150, at 109; Ed Cavazos & Mike Godwin, Intellectual
Property and the Internet, TEX. LAW., Sept. 9, 1996, at 10.
177. Grogan, supra note 131, at 1.
178. Mitchell Zimmerman, Copyright in the Digital Electronic Environment, in
UNDERSTANDING BASIC CopyRiGHT LAW 409, 462 (PLI ed., 1997).
179. Gibbons & Gibbons, supra note 150, at 109.
180. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
181. Id. at 1556.
182. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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of "public" applies to displays of copyrighted works, the transmission of a
destination site would constitute an infringement.1
8 3
b. Who Is Liable?
The analysis of hyperlinking does not end with the conclusion that it
constitutes a copyright infringement. An issue remains as to who should
be liable for such infringement. The possible defendants are the link
provider and the Internet user. A defendant's liability and the type of
infringement at issue depends on a defendant's involvement in the
infringing activity. 1 4 Because a copy of the destination site is not created
until a link is activated, the link provider would not be liable for direct
infringement.18 5  However, because a copy is reproduced on a user's
computer, a user would be liable for directly infringing the destination
site's copyright. 186 While placing liability on the user seems harsh, the
law does not consider a direct infringer's intent or knowledge.
1 87
In addition to holding an Internet user liable, the link provider may
still be accountable under the principles of contributory infringement.
Applying the doctrine of contributory infringement, the link provider
would be liable if it had knowledge of the infringement, and it
substantially participated in the infringing act. 1 8 In providing the link to a
destination site, a defendant expected that Internet users would utilize the
link, and therefore, it would have the requisite knowledge. However, a
defendant could assert that it lacked the required knowledge. Because a
contributory infringer must know of the infringing act, and the law
regarding hyperlinking is undeveloped, a link provider could take
advantage of the vagueness in the law by arguing that it did not know
whether a RAM copy constituted an infringement. Assuming, however,
that a defendant knows of the user's infringement, a defendant has
facilitated such infringement by providing the link to the destination
site. 189
Lastly, vicarious infringement would apply if the link provider can
control or supervise the direct infringer's conduct and receive a financial
benefit from the infringing act. This type of liability presumes a
183. See discussion supra Part lI.C.5 and discussion supra note 72.
184. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
188. See discussion supra Part III.D.
189. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5.
commercial relationship between the link provider and the Internet user.190
Hypothetically, this relationship can arise if a link provider charges users
for access to its Web site. By controlling what links are available on its
linking site, a link provider has the requisite control and supervision for
vicarious liability. Furthermore, because a link provider benefits
financially from a link to the destination site, it would be vicariously
liable.
c. Fair Use?
The final inquiry is whether an Internet user would have an
affirmative defense. If users are simply browsing on the Internet, they
could successfully claim a fair use privilege.' 91 First, the purpose and
character of the use is non-commercial because the RAM copy is merely
the result of browsing. 92 Furthermore, the use of the copy is not in bad
faith because an Internet user is only viewing the destination site. Second,
the nature of the copyrighted work supports a finding of fair use. By
placing a site on the Internet, the author anticipates that users will access
it. However, although the amount and substantiality of the use by the
RAM copy is inconsistent with a fair use, the RAM copy does not
negatively impact the market for the destination site.' 93 As a practical
matter, direct links actually benefit the destination site by increasing the
number of visitors, that, in turn, attract businesses to advertise on the
destination site.
Thus, while the copy in RAM constitutes an infringement of the
destination site's copyright, the private use of the RAM copy should entitle
a user to a fair use privilege. However, by providing Internet users with a
fair use privilege, a link provider is absolved from any contributory or
vicarious liability because no underlying infringement has occurred.
d. Implied License
The strongest argument offered in favor of hyperlinking is that
Internet users and link providers receive an implied license from the
destination site's owner. r94 By having a Web site on the Internet, the
190. See discussion supra Part .D regarding vicarious infringement.
191. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Rose, supra note 148, at S3; Mark Eckenwiler, Copyright on the Web Enhanced,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at S29; Merrill & Berger, supra note 138.
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copyright owner tacitly consents to anyone accessing the site.
195
Therefore, a link provider can hyperlink to the site, and a user can
download the destination site onto his or her computer.
196
However, this defense should not be interpreted as a blanket
exemption for the act of hyperlinking. To use an analogy, if an author
distributed copies of his or her book to the public, the author would
nonetheless retain a copyright in the book. A purchaser of the book could
not reproduce the author's work and then sell unauthorized copies. Thus,
even though an author publishes on the Internet, the author does not
relinquish his or her copyright in the site's contents.
197
In addition, a Web site operator can negate an implied license by
placing a notice or legend on its Web site providing an express license for
hyperlinking. For instance, a site operator could require a link provider to
only connect to the destination site's home page.' 8  If a hyperlink
connects to a Web page other than the home page, the link provider has
exceeded the license.
2. Framing
Framing provides a plaintiff with a stronger case for infringement
against the link provider. Because the linking site remains on the user's
screen together with the framed destination site, this method of linking
appears more suspect. If one considers framing outside the Internet
context, it is essentially the pirating of copyrighted material.200 Framing
195. Home Sweet Home, supra note 137, at 109.
196. Id.
197. Grogan, supra note 131, at 3.
198. A "home page" is the introductory Web page to a site. RICK STOUT, THE WORLD
WInE WEB COMPLETE REFERENCE 7 (1995).
199. In fact, many sites contain a Web page providing the terms and conditions for use of
the Web site. For example, ABCNEWS.com provides in its terms of use:
Ownership; Restrictions
All materials contained in this site are the copyrighted property of ABC
News/Starwave Partners (the "ABC Venture"), its parent, subsidiaries and
affiliated companies (the "Related Parties") and/or licensors (the "Licensors").
"ABC" and all titles, characters, names and graphics are trademarks of ABC, Inc.,
the ABC Venture, and/or their licensors. To reproduce, republish, upload, post,
transmit, modify, distribute or publicly perform or display material from this site,
you must first obtain written permission from the ABC Venture. You may view
and download material from this site for your personal, non-commercial home use
only.
Terms of Use, ABCNEWS.COM (visited April 2, 1998) <http://www.abcnews.com/
service/terms.html> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal)
(emphasis added).
200. Washington Post Complaint, supra note 6, 10.
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has recently come under attack in Washington Post Co. v. TotalNEWS,
Inc.
20 1
In February 1997, the Washington Post and other media companies
202
filed a lawsuit against a news Web site, TotalNEWS, for infringing the
copyright in their Web sites. The plaintiffs were various news
organizations that either published newspapers and magazines, operated a
news wire service, or broadcasted television news, as well as maintained
on-line versions on the Web. Each of the publishers had a registered
copyright in the contents of their Web sites. TotalNEWS was the operator
of a news Web site with hyperlinks to approximately 1350 news sites on
the Internet.203  TotalNEWS linked to the plaintiffs' Web sites by
displaying their contents within frames on its site. °4 While the defendant
did not add any substantive material of its own to the plaintiffs' work, it
sold advertisements on its Web site by capitalizing on the public's
attraction to the destination site's contents.
The plaintiffs claimed that TotalNEWS "engaged in the Internet
equivalent of pirating copyrighted material from a variety of famous
newspapers, magazines, or television news programs." 20 6 Accordingly, the
defendant was able to attract users to its site through its unauthorized use
of the plaintiffs' news stories. As a result, the defendant allegedly profited
from the advertising through its site and at the cost of advertisements on207
the destination sites. The plaintiffs further objected to the use of frames
because it altered the form and appearance of their sites.20 8 Although this
case did not proceed to trial, it provided an insight into the use of frames
and hyperlinks in general.
Under the settlement order, the defendant agreed to permanently
cease the practice of framing.209 While the defendant can directly link tothe plaintiffs' Web sites, such links prohibit the defendant from
201. No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 7, 1997).
202. The other plaintiffs in the suit included Time, Inc., Entertainment Weekly, Inc., CNN,
Los Angeles Times, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., and Reuters New Media, Inc. Washington
Post Complaint, supra note 6, IN 14-2 1.
203. Matt Richtel, Legal Situation Is Confused on Web Content Protections, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 1997, at D5.
204. Washington Post Complaint, supra note 6, 8.
205. Id.
206. Id. 10.
207. Id. 10.
208. Id. 30.
209. Washington Post Order of Settlement 3, available in Frames Technology: The
Internet Equivalent of Pirating?, L.J. EXTRA ON-LINE (visited Aug. 7, 1997)
<http://www.ljx.com/internet.complain.html> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Washington Post Order of Settlement].
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circumventing any advertisements appearing on the plaintiffs' sites.210 In
addition, TotalNEWS must only use hyperlinks that display the names of
the destination sites in plain text.2 11 However, the order does not restrict
TotalNEWS from hyperlinking to pages other than the plaintiffs' home
pages. Accordingly, the issue arises as to whether direct links to pages
other than the home page may implicate the same concerns under framing,
specifically altering the form of a Web site.
2 12
a. Is a Framed Web Site a Derivative Work?
By incorporating the contents of a framed destination site, a link
provider has violated the copyright owner's adaptation right, effectively
creating a derivative work of the destination site.2 13 This conclusion is
supported by the holding in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T.
Co. 14 In Mirage Editions, the plaintiff owned the copyrights to various
215artwork by Patrick Nagel. The plaintiff licensed the artwork for
publication in a book commemorating Nagel's achievements. 16  The
defendant, Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. ("A.R.T."), engaged in the business of
mounting artwork on ceramic tiles and then selling them to the public.
2 17
After obtaining a copy of the plaintiff's book, A.R.T. mounted some of the
pages onto tiles. The plaintiff subsequently brought suit for
infringement of its adaptation right. The court, finding in favor of the
plaintiff, stated that A.R.T. had made "another version of Jplaintiff's] art
works... amount[ing] to preparation of a derivative work."
The framing of a destination site's contents is analogous to the
infringing activity in Mirage Editions. From the Internet authors'
perspective, a framing site "mounts" the contents of other Web sites onto
its pages. Conceivably, because an infringement of the adaptation right
only requires a recasting of the underlying work in some form, a plaintiff
210. See discussion supra Part ll.C.
211. Washington Post Order of Settlement 3, supra note 209.
212. Taken as a whole, a Web site may also be recognized as a copyrightable compilation.
Rose, supra note 148, at S3. Arguably, if a link provider connects to a Web page other than the
home page, one could assert that the link provider is modifying or transforming the work.
213. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5.
214. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Annie Lee v. Deck the Walls, Inc., 925 F.
Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding the mounting of notecards on ceramic tiles did not constitute
an infringing derivative work).
215. Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1342.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1343 (citation omitted).
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could argue that the framing site alters the way in which the plaintiff
intended its Web site to appear. 22  The Mirage Editions court, citing the
legislative history of section 106 of the Copyright Act, stated that the
adaptation right is violated when "the infringing work... incorporate[s] a
portion of the copyrighted work in some form."
Additionally, in Gilliam v. ABC, the Second Circuit held that an
author has a right to prohibit the public presentation of his or her work in a
distorted form. The court noted that one who "makes an unauthorized
use of the underlying work by publishing it in a truncated version" is an
infringer. 224  Another court held that the unauthorized addition of
advertisements in a book constituted an infringement of the adaptation
right.225  Finally, in WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United
Video,226 the Seventh Circuit stated that even though a copyright owner
does not make use of its adaptation right, it nonetheless retains the option
to use the right later, and thus, a licensee cannot alter the copyrighted
227work. Applying this line of reasoning to the act of hyperlinking, the
operator of the framing site should be directly liable for infringing a
destination site's adaptation right.
b. Is the Link Provider Liable?
Technically, the infringing derivative work is not created until a user
clicks on the hyperlink. Because a hyperlink itself does not infringe a
copyright, the operator of a framing site has not altered any part of the
destination site. 8 Accordingly, the Internet user would remain directly
liable, but that person would likely receive a fair use privilege. 229 In short,
framing enables a link provider to copy a Web site's contents without
actually copying it, precluding the copying element from ever being
satisfied.
220. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5.
221. 856 F.2d at 1344 (quoting 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5675). As Nimmer on Copyright
argues, however, the fixation requirement applies intuitively to the adaptation right.
Accordingly, the infringement claim against framing is also clouded by the fixation issue
discussed under the direct link analysis.
222. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
223. Id. at 24.
224. Id. at 21.
225. National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 544 (W.D. Tex.
1980).
226. 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1983).
227. Id. at 625-26.
228. See discussion supra Part [V.A.I.b.
229. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.c.
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c. Fair Use?
Assuming, however, that the proper defendant is the link provider, it
may be entitled to claim a fair use privilege. First, the purpose of the use
may be either commercial or non-commercial.230 As in TotalNEWS, a link
provider can sell advertisements on its site by marketing its arrangement of
hyperlinks to various Web sites.231 Continuing with this hypothetical, the
use is in bad faith because a link provider merely exploits the contents of
the framed destination sites. Second, if a plaintiff is also attempting to
profit from the contents of its Web site, the nature of the copyrighted work
does not support a fair use privilege. Third, as with a direct link, a framing
site reproduces the destination site in its entirety. Lastly, a copyright
owner has a strong argument under the fourth factor. The framing of a
destination site has a harmful effect on its market because the framing site
directly competes with the plaintiff for advertising revenue as well as the
attention of Internet users. Clearly, if courts analyze framing outside of
the Internet context, the linker has no fair use defense.
d. Implied License
As in the case of direct links, an owner of a framing site could assert
an implied license to hyperlink to a plaintiff's Web site. 233 However, a
framing site could still violate a destination site's adaptation right. As
noted by the court in WGN, if not expressly authorized by the copyright
owner, a licensee does not have the right to make derivative works.2
34
With respect to the act of hyperlinking, even though a framing site may
receive an implied license to hyperlink directly to various sites, it has no
right to modify another Web site's contents.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Copyright Act Inadequately Protects the Rights of Internet Authors
Because the technology of the Internet raises many cuestions about
applying traditional copyright concepts to this medium, the current
230. Freeling & Levi, supra note 8, at S5.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See discussion supra Parts Ill.F., IV.B.l.d.
234. WGN, 693 F.2d at 625.
235. Courts have had to analogize to past cases in order to handle issues raised by the
Internet. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
PARA-SITES
copyright law must be amended to take account of such issues. Without
such amendments, the lack of guidance in this area would inevitably result
in disparate court decisions.
2 36
Congress has consistently recognized that the Copyright Act must be
adjusted to protect the rights of authors against technological
innovations.237 Although the current law provides Internet users a fair use
privilege, it fails to place liability on the operators of framing sites for
apparent acts of copyright infringement. Because an infringement initially
turns on when an infringing copy is made, a person can frame another Web
site's contents without risk of liability. With a print medium, the same
person would not be held contributorily liable, but directly liable.
Consequently, the current copyright law must be amended to incorporate
the traditional rules of copyright infringement into the Internet medium.
In February 1993, the Clinton administration responded to the
challenges raised by the Internet by forming the Information Infrastructure
Task Force ("IITF").238  The IITF was commissioned to study and
recommend an effective use for the National Information Infrastructure
("NII"). 239 The report, entitled Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter the White Paper), represents the
IITF's efforts on the subject. Although the White Paper examines all of
the major areas of intellectual property law, its recommendations under
copyright law offer a possible solution to the issues raised by hyperlinking.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding an Internet service provider is not vicariously liable
unless the infringer's activity enhances the provider's services or attracts new subscribers); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding an on-line service
provider vicariously liable for allowing the uploading and downloading of copyrighted video
games); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding the
operator of a bulletin board service ("BBS") directly liable for its subscriber's placement of
copyrighted photographs on the BBS).
236. This occurrence is already evidenced by the court decisions concerning fixation for
copyright infringement. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) with MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
237. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-
Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 90 (1997); Jeffrey M. Gott, Note, Lotus
Development Corporation v. Borland International: The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit Takes A Step Backward for the Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, 30
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1349, 1355 (1997).
238. The IITF is a group of representatives from federal agencies involved in the
development of information and telecommunications technologies. WHITE PAPER, supra note
32, at 1. Recently, the HTF collaborated with private sector organizations, public interest
groups, and state and local governments to develop a policy on intellectual property and the Nil.
Id.
239. The Nil is the emerging U.S. information infrastructure, which includes the Internet.
Id. at 2 n.5.
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B. Congress Must Clarify the Current Copyright Law
Specifically, the White Paper provides that the "placement of
copyrighted material into a computer's memory is a reproduction of that
material. ' 24°  Because a plaintiff's claim for copyright infringement
depends on how a court interprets when a copy is "fixed," the White
Paper's assumption that a RAM copy is fixed provides a Web site author
the necessary protection against unauthorized linking to its site. While this
aggressive interpretation of MAI has been criticized,24 1 it reassures
copyright-intensive businesses and institutions on the Internet that their
rights will be protected. Without such a change, the law on this subject
will remain unsettled. Congress should therefore incorporate into the
Copyright Act the MAI holding regarding the copyright implications of a
copy embodied in RAM.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet offers unprecedented benefits for authors and for
society, in general, but if authors are to be encouraged to publish on the
Internet, they must be assured that their proprietary rights in their
copyrighted works will be protected.242 Because the contents of Web sites
will ultimately drive the development of the Internet, the development of
that material depends on the protections afforded by copyright law. If the
law fails to protect these proprietary concerns, however, the very fabric of
the Internet may unravel.
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240. Id. at 64.
241. See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab (visited Aug. 28, 1997)
<http://wwww.wired.com/wired/4.01/features/whitepaper.html> (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
242. A plaintiff in the TotaINEWS case stated that "Internet businesses had to feel that their
intellectual property was protected on line or they would have no incentive to post valuable
content." Richtel, supra note 203, at D5.
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